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There is only one safeguard against the distortion of democratic ideals that any too dominant
executive can produce and the perversion of those ideals which invariably results from the dominance
of a charismatic individual or the monopoly of a dogmatic ideology. This is a strong representative
assembly to which the Head of Government and ministers are answerable for all that they do.
Moreover, the administration must be answerable not only in formal or institutional terms
(meaning the legislature must have clear powers under the constitution) but also in practical
terms (meaning elected representatives must exercise those powers with due diligence). This brings
the argument to the fundamental obligation of a Head of Government and ministers, which is
acknowledgement that parliamentarians have the right to know everything there is to know about an
administration s business. In practice the communication of information, or its release on a restricted
basis, is normally regulated on the basis of the need to know. This may be routinely denied in several
areas: for example, in respect of information about imminent changes in taxation or intended purchases
of real estate; or on matters currently under negotiation with another government or international
institution; or, in the defence domain, in relation to data about the precise capability of specific
weapons or the exact size of weapons stocks. There have to be some 'state secrets '. Outside these
areas, however, freedom of information ought to be the rule.
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1. Introduction
This paper has three parts. The first is an ex-
tended commentary on the different forms of gov-
ernance that have been practised over the centuries,
and which are still represented in today's world. The
purpose here is to stimulate reflection about some
fundamentals of politics, particularly on the nature
of the relationship between the executive power and
the population under various arrangements. The ar-
ticle leads to important conclusions about the essen-
tial role of elected representatives in democratic so-
cieties.
There follows an examination of the basic
obligations of the executive and the key responsi-
bilities of those representatives - or the legislature -
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once the nature of that role has been established. This
is the second part of this article.
The third is an enumeration of the institutions
and procedures that must be put in place if legisla-
tors are to perform their role effectively. At this point,
particular attention will be paid to national security
affairs (broadly defined) and a specification of' ideal'
provisions (which, incidentally, very few mature
democracies can boast about) will be outlined. This
specification could be used as a checklist against
which to gauge the situation in other states 'in tran-
sition' from one-party rule to plural politics.
2. Forms of Governance
It was the thinkers of ancient Greece who first
propounded the political philosophy that supreme
power (kratos) is vested in 'the people' collectively
(demos) and that, therefore, the business of ruling
15
16 CROATIAN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS REVIEW
cities, territories and nations should be in the hands
of persons chosen by, and answerable to, the popu-
lace. However, we know that for around two thou-
sand years this prescription - demokratia, or democ-
racy found very few takers around the world. 'Gov-
ernment of the people, by the people, for the people'
- in the succinct American formulation of the late
eighteenth century - was preached more often than it
was practised.
Indeed it was not preached all that much, since
to campaign for democracy would have been tanta-
mount to treason or heresy (or both). That is because
the prevailing forms of governance - instances of
which are still to be found - were autocracy and the-
ocracy. The former rests on the notion that absolute
power reposes in a single individual (the emperor,
king, tsar, sheikh, sultan or whatever), and the mon-
arch rules directly (with or without the advice of oth-
ers). The latter is founded on the belief that supreme
power resides with a deity. Government is therefore
by divine commands rather than human ordinances,
communication of the holy will being entrusted to
spiritual leaders (pontiffs, bishops, ayatollahs or
whatever).
The present-day examples of these forms are
well known, and some are not far away. In Saudi
Arabia, the King and royal house rule autocratically.
In the neighbouring Gulf states, sheikhs, sultans and
emirs do likewise. Meanwhile, in Iran, the ayatollahs
govern with an Islamic rectitude bordering at times
on the fanatical, though increasingly these days to
an accompanying chorus of protest. In a handful of
other places, too, it is the religious writ that runs.
Several observations are in order here. First,
both the autocratic and theocratic forms of govern-
ance invoke higher authority - an hereditary licence
or divine sanction. Thus they exemplify 'top-down'
politics and produce authoritarian (or even totalitar-
ian) rule. This need not necessarily be oppressive:
some historians have characterised the eighteenth
century as an age of 'benevolent despotism' in Eu-
rope. However, no one has ever claimed that under
these arrangements 'the people' were (or are) any-
thing but passive objects of government, having few
freedoms, enjoying strictly limited rights and privi-
leges, and exerting little or no influence on their rul-
ers.
Secondly, it is remarkable how often in the
past monarchs laid claim to both secular and reli-
gious authority, on the basis of either their dynasty's
holy ancestry or assertion of a Divine Right of Kings
- the European formulation - and equivalents else-
where. Clearly they thought their subjects' loyalty
might be more robust if respect for the sovereign
were reinforced by awe of the Almighty.
Thirdly, it is equally remarkable how often,
when societies did opt for the democratic 'model' of
governance, they chose nevertheless to retain the
institution of hereditary monarchy - albeit with a titu-
lar sovereign - to provide, among other things, a fo-
cus of higher loyalty than that associated with obe-
dience to the laws of the land promulgated by the
government of the day. Moreover, as you know, this
formula of so-called constitutional monarchy remains
popular - in the strict sense of enjoying the approval
of 'the people' - and nowhere more so than on the
European continent. Currently I live and work in two
states: the United Kingdom and the Netherlands. In
each a Queen reigns, but does not rule. In neither,
though, do 'the people' - with whom sovereign power
now effectively resides - want to dispense with the
symbolic expression of that power in their heredi-
tary Head of State. Quite the contrary: they cherish
the arrangement, and even revere 'the sovereign' who
dignifies their own emancipation.
To understand fully the retention (as in Brit-
ain and the Netherlands) - and even the recent resto-
ration (as in Spain) - of a dynastic monarchy within
a structure of democratic politics one needs to ap-
preciate the dilemmas of the democratic 'model'
wherever it is adopted.
The first of these is: how to reconcile the Greek
philosophers' concept that power is vested in 'the
people' collectively with the reality that it is imprac-
tical for all 'the people' to engage in the day-to-day
management of their collective affairs (except, per-
haps, in very small communities). Clearly there is
only one solution. The populace must select repre-
sentatives to serve for them in this role. Nowadays
we would add that this choice should be made in
free and fair elections, on the basis of universal adult
suffrage, applied within a geographical or other con-
stituency system - in order to ensure true, compre-
hensive and balanced representation.
This is the fundamental reason why we have
the Congress of the United States, Germany's
Bundestag and all our various National Assemblies,
Chambers of Deputies and so on. Representation is
their raison d'etre. It is customary to refer to such
bodies as the legislature - meaning the law-making
forum - of the land, and I shall follow this practice.
However, an institution is defined by what it is rather
than by (one of) the things it does. So one should
always think of the representational character of
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elected forums. A crucial corollary should be noted,
to which some reference is made later. Membership
of these bodies entails a commitment to serve the
electorate. (In most of our societies the elected rep-
resentative is accorded a certain status, acquires a
certain prestige, gains access to certain benefits and
may even be presented with opportunities for per-
sonal enrichment. As a result, we encounter occa-
sionally the parliamentarian who is full of his (or
her) own importance or is interested principally in
turning his (or her) position to private advantage.
Needless to say, if too many individuals thus lose
sight of the 'commitment to serve' democracy is
endangered. )
The second of democracy's dilemmas is: how
to reconcile the notion of sovereign people-power,
as made manageable in a representative assembly,
with the need for (a) efficient government (and, for
practical purposes, an individual Head of Govern-
ment) and (b) an acceptable personification of that
power, mainly for ceremonial purposes (that is, a
formal Head of State, provincial Governor, munici-
pal Mayor or whatever). At the national level, this
challenge has been met in broadly two ways, by ei-
ther a presidential or prime ministerial approach.
Under the presidential approach 'the people'
periodically select a chief executive an experienced
politician chosen by direct election - who in turn
appoints a ministerial team and, with them, assumes
direction of the state's permanent bureaucracy. The
leader and his team 'enter office' and 'come to
power' in the sense that collectively they take over
the executive functions of government, with the
leader as Head of Government. Under some consti-
tutional arrangements the chief executive also acts
as Head of State. Under others, a respected national
personality may perform this role.
Under the prime ministerial approach 'the
people' periodically elect their representative assem-
bly (legislature). The political party or coalition com-
manding most support here forms a ministerial team
- a 'government' or administration or executive -
under a first or prime minister (usually the leader of
the majority or dominant party in the assembly). This
individual thus becomes Head of Government. So
far as the role of Head of State is concerned, this
may be entrusted to an eminent personage separately
elected or nominated. Alternatively, as in the United
Kingdom and the Netherlands, it may be fulfilled by
a constitutional monarch who 'reigns but does not
rule'.
There are several variants of the presidential
and prime ministerial approaches to reconciling the
'bottom-up' prerequisite of democratic theory and
the 'top-down' imperative of effective administra-
tion. Each of the two forms (and variants) has its
merits and demerits. For instance, there are evident
practical advantages in having a single Head of State
and Government - as in the Presidency of the United
States. At the same time there are drawbacks, nota-
bly when the policy priorities of the chief executive
and those of the majority in the representative as-
sembly differ. This requires 'cohabitation' which may
be uncomfortable, even paralysing. Thus there is vir-
tue in the separation of the roles - as in the constitu-
tional monarchies. In this arrangement too, however,
problems arise: such as whether the prime allegiance
of public servants (including the uniformed military)
should be to the Crown or the current administra-
tion-in-office. Moreover, when the Head of State is
directly elected and has his or her own political
agenda, the 'cohabitation' issue arises - as it has done
in France of late and, on some matters, in Bulgaria,
the Czech Republic, Poland, Slovakia and Russia (to
cite just half-a-dozen instances).
Yet these difficulties pale in comparison with
the central vulnerability of democracy which is as-
sociated with the need to reconcile respect for the
sovereign power of 'the people' on the one hand, the
practical necessity of firm governance on the other.
The reference is made to the possibility that admin-
istration may come to be totally dominated by a sin-
gle individual, a singular ideology - or a devastating
combination of both - while democratic appearances
are preserved and democratic legitimacy claimed.
This is a real danger, especially in societies
conditioned by centuries of authoritarian rule to tacit
deference or prompted by an economic or political
crisis to espouse 'strong leadership' as an explicit
preference. Thus, in the Belgrade of the 1990s,
Siobodan Milosevic governed with nominally im-
peccable democratic credentials. Thus, for most of
this century, most of the transition countries experi-
enced a strain of dogmatic socialism which was in-
troduced with the persuasive democratic rhetoric of
'power to the people' and sustained by the doctrine
of 'democratic centralism' even though the latter
phrase is just a clever euphemism for the profoundly
anti-democratic proposition that 'the Party knows
best' about everything. Thus, to cite the 'devastat-
ing combination' that cast its shadow over the whole
of Europe for most of the second quarter of the twen-
tieth century, Adolf Hitler and National Socialism
swept a humiliated, impoverished and crisis-ridden
Germany on a groundswell of popular support.
18 CROATIAN iNTERNATIONAL RELATIONS REVIEW
There is only one safeguard against the dis-
tortion of democratic ideals that any too dominant
executive can produce and the perversion of those
ideals which invariably results from the dominance
of a charismatic individual or the monopoly of a
dogmatic ideology. This is a strong representative
assembly to which the Head of Government and min-
isters are answerable for all that they do. Moreover,
the administration must be answerable not only in
formal or institutional terms (meaning the legisla-
ture must have clear powers under the constitution)
but also in practical terms (meaning elected repre-
sentatives must exercise those powers with due dili-
gence).
In addition, it matters how such powers are
exercised. This is where the 'commitment to serve'
is all-important. It is the responsibility of parliarnen-
tarians to ensure that the executive acts 'for the peo-
ple' (as the American Founding Fathers put it). This
means scrutinising policy proposals and supporting
only those which clearly accord with the national
interest rather than any elite or factional interest. It
means scrutinising plans and programmes for the
accomplishment of policy objectives and endorsing
only those which can be expected to command popu-
lar support. It means scrutinising budgets for the re-
alisation of plans and programmes and approving
only those resource allocations which may be taken
to reflect societal priorities. It also means scrutinis-
ing the implementation of policies, plans, pro-
grammes and budgets, and exposing any circum-
stances where, for example, executive action is at
odds with declaratory policy or resources manage-
ment has been uneconomic, inefficient or ineffec-
tive. (Cases of actual illegality in resource use - where
funds have not been spent as appropriated - are, of
course, matters for what should be an independent
and trustworthy judiciary. However, elected repre-
sentatives can be instrumental in bringing such
abuses to light and insisting on redress.)
We have reached now the promised conclu-
sions about the essential role of the legislature (and
legislators) in democratic societies. As elaborated
here, it is a dual role.
• First, the parliamentarian's basic duty is to
represent 'the people' generally. Particular constitu-
ency interests may require special attention: but the
constituency system is primarily a device for ensur-
ing that an elected chamber offers 'true, balanced
and comprehensive' representation of 'the people';
and those chosen to serve in it are representatives,
they are not delegates.
• Secondly, the elected representatives' cen-
tral responsibility is to provide effective oversight
of executive power in whatever context such power
is exercised: policy-making, planning, programming,
budgeting. Despite the customary designation of an
elected assembly as the legislature, actual lawmaking
is an important but not the most important of its func-
tions.
Moreover it will bear repeating that demo-
cratic theory presupposes a 'commitment to serve'
the wider society. If laudable ambition leads to pre-
occupation with the advancement of personal inter-




Having established the nature of the legisla-
ture's role in democratic societies certain implica-
tions in terms of the executive's obligations and rep-
resentatives' responsibilities should be briefly dealt
with.
Beginning with 'the executive's obligations',
it is self-evident that in a democracy there should be
'open' government. That is to say, the administra-
tion of the nation's affairs should be conducted with-
out excessive secrecy: parliamentarians and the pub-
lic should be well informed about the business of
government, including at least the general directions
of the authorities' thinking prior to policy decision
making. The underlying philosophical premise of this
form of governance - that absolute power is vested
in 'the people' - requires openness. The practical
corollary - parliamentary oversight of all that the
Head of Government and ministers do - demands it.
The executive must, therefore, be committed
to transparency - to use the currently fashionable
term - in the national security field as in all others.
This is not a very easy obligation for governments
to acknowledge, let alone observe. In infant democ-
racies openness is usually a completely alien notion.
In so-called adolescent democracies - states which
are still discovering what it's all about pushing back
the frontiers of official secrecy, and thereby limiting
the ability of the authorities to manipulate public
information, has rarely been the reform priority it
should have been. Indeed we have seen the curious
phenomenon of governments willing to communi-
cate details about their defences to other governments
- as in the so-called Vienna Documents generated by
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the confidence- and security-building process of the
Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Eu-
rope (OSCE) - but unwilling to make the same mate-
rial available to their own parliaments and publics.
Not that this is altogether surprising, given that even
mature democracies find 'transparency' a trouble-
some concept. Certainly defence ministers and the
top brass of the military are often ambivalent about
it, partly because they subscribe to the old dictum
that 'knowledge is power' (everywhere), partly be-
cause they regard their responsibilities as uniquely
sensitive (and so the fewer people know their dispo-
sitions, and the less they know, the better).
None of the foregoing, however, alters the fact
that an executive not 'committed to transparency' is
one which is failing to fulfil a core democratic obli-
gation; and a government which presents to foreign-
ers information that it is not prepared to share with
its own legislature is one which has yet to under-
stand what democracy is about.
This brings the argument to the fundamental
obligation of a Head of Government and ministers,
which is acknowledgement that parliamentarians
have the right to know everything there is to know
about an administration's business. In practice the
communication of information, or its release on a
restricted basis, is normally regulated on the basis
of the need to know. This may be routinely denied in
several areas: for example, in respect of information
about imminent changes in taxation or intended pur-
chases of real estate; or on matters currently under
negotiation with another government or international
institution; or, in the defence domain, in relation to
data about the precise capability of specific weap-
ons or the exact size of weapons stocks. There have
to be some 'state secrets'. Outside these areas, how-
ever, freedom of information ought to be the rule.
Moreover, these practical limitations, without which
it would be impossible to run a nation's affairs, do
not affect the underlying principle: 'the right to know'
is fundamental.
In fact the parliamentarians' entitlement to
information is, of course, a derived entitlement -
derived from the population's right to know what is
being done in its name (remember demokratia). The
issue of public information as an executive and leg-
islative - obligation is not, however, one which will
be dwelt upon. It is the connection that should be
registered here. Arguing that an executive should
transmit facts and figures to the representatives of
'the people' is in effect asserting the public's right
to know. The logical implication of this is that infor-
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mati on made available to the legislature should, so
far as possible, also be made public (at the same time
or in due course).
A commitment to transparency and acknowl-
edgement of elected representatives' right to know
about affairs are the fundamental executive obliga-
tions under the democratic form of governance. How-
ever, they are general obligations. What about the
details of day-to-day business in public policy-mak-
ing and administration? What are the specific obli-
gations here? The short answer is that there is a sin-
gle all-encompassing requirement, summed up in the
proposition that the Head of Government and minis-
ters (and the permanent bureaucracy) are account-
able to the legislature - and, through the elected cham-
ber to society-at-large - for all that they do. In other
words executive accountability is the essence of prac-
tical democratic politics. Clearly, therefore, the con-
cept requires elucidation.
By accountability we mean two things, reflect-
ing the two senses in which the root word 'account'
- as both noun and verb - is used in the English lan-
guage. This duality should be established before pro-
ceeding.
1. One may say to a person 'Give an account of
what you did yesterday'; and he/she expects that, in
response, the person will reveal and explain his/her
several actions and decisions.
2. One may say to a person 'Show me the
account(s) for this or that activity'; and he/she ex-
pects that the person will declare and, if required,
justify his/her expenditure for the purpose in ques-
tion.
The 'duality' arises because, in English, we
use the word 'account' for both ideas. In some other
languages there are - very sensibly (and conveniently)
- different words for the different, but related, sorts
of accounting. The French, for instance, would use
raconter for the first, rendre compte (or rendre des
comptes) for the second. I expect many other native
languages make the same distinction.
Following directly from this clarification -
therefore executive accountability may be defined
as embracing:
• an obligation to reveal and explain actions
and decisions in all areas of public affairs (including
the national security field);
and
• an obligation to declare and justify expendi-
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tures for all public purposes (including security and
defence).
We may call the first policy accountability. We
may call the second financial accountability. Both
accepted by the administration if a country's legisla-
ture is to perform its central oversight function ef-
fectively.
Turning now to 'representatives' responsibili-
ties' it is convenient to retrace the preceding argu-
ment. This is because, broadly speaking, the duties
in question are mirror-images of the executive obli-
gations just described.
Thus the essence of practical democratic poli-
tics, seen from the perspective of the elected cham-
ber, is the exercise of legislative oversight of the
government-in-office; and this is accomplished pri-
marily by holding the administration to account for
the policies that it pursues and for the taxpayers'
money that it spends. In practice it is a little more
complicated than this. As noted earlier, oversight
requires scrutinising (a) policy formulation - from
exploring aspirations to framing concrete objectives;
and (b) policy implementation - from the drawing-
up of plans and programmes for the fulfilment of
objectives to the construction of budgets for realis-
ing these. There should also be periodic ex post policy
evaluation. It also requires scrutinising (i) resource
allocation - how and for what purposes funds are
allotted among competing national priorities and
sectoral priorities (e.g. in defence); and (ii) resources
management - focusing on the use of funds in terms
of not only legality and propriety (the classic audit
function) but also economy, efficiency and effective-
ness (the value-for-money audit function). These are
the mirror-images of policy accountability and fi-
nancial accountability.
It is impossible to imagine an elected assem-
bly 'holding the administration to account' in a seri-
ous manner without the power to send for the people
and papers that must be interrogated and inspected
in order to perform an in-depth scrutiny. Put in an-
other way, it is impossible for there to be meaning-
ful oversight if the legislature is denied access to
information about at least the general directions of
the administration's thinking before policy decisions
are taken and about objectives once decisions have
been taken (so that it can function as an interlocutor
on policy formulation); and about the content of re-
sultant governmental plans, programmes and budg-
ets (so that it can comment on policy implementa-
tion). Similarly, legislators must have access to de-
tailed material about intended expenditures, prefer-
ably data relating funds to programmes - and hence
objectives - and ideally multi-year projections and
not simply the current or immediately forthcoming
year's figures (if they are to approve the allocation
of resources); and they must receive a detailed record
of actual expenditures on personnel, supplies and
capital projects in every area of the state's business
(ifthey are to fulfil their classic and value-for-money
audit responsibilities). None of these facts and fig-
ures will be forthcoming unless the elected repre-
sentatives have established their 'right to know' about
the relevant matters.
This is where adolescent democracies often
find it hardest to make decisive headway in their
transformations from highly secretive one-party gov-
ernance to open plural politics. Indeed one could go
so far as to say that establishing the right to know -
persuading presidents and ruling politicians, bureau-
crats and generals on this point - may be the biggest
single challenge facing democratically-elected rep-
resentatives in such states. The habits of authoritar-
ian rule persist. The 'right' is not easily established.
It is not even acknowledged - or conceded - in many,
if not most, places. However, it must be boldly as-
serted, won, and then consolidated. Unless and until
this happens formal constitutional innovation con-
cerning the executive's accountability, regarding
national security affairs or any other area of state
activity, cannot count for much.
Democracy will remain anaemic, also, wher-
ever the government-in-office is halfhearted in its
commitment to transparency, wherever there is no
real dedication to 'open' government. One reason
for this is that openness is a precondition for the
emergence - in our special area of interest - of a 'se-
curity community' of nongovernmental organisations
(NGOs), think tanks and academics who pay atten-
tion to these affairs, and for informed coverage of
security issues in the print and broadcast media. This
combination is valuable because it not only feeds
the legislature and improves elected representatives'
ability to exercise oversight, it can also generate in-
formation and promote debate, facilitating the en-
gagement of society-at-large in defence-related mat-
ters. That brings this particular argument full circle -
back to 'the people'.
4. Institutions and Procedures
The emergence ofa 'security community' and
informed coverage of security issues in the media
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can help parliamentarians perform their oversight
role more effectively; and engaging the interest of
'the people' in security matters can be a strong mo-
tivation to do so. However, institutions and proce-
dures through which the role is formally exercised -
a number of 'sets' in which elected representatives
can act on the political stage - are the necessary con-
dition for effectiveness in this regard. An enumera-
tion of these is the final element of this article.
The word 'enumeration' is used advisedly. A
list of 'ideal' provisions will be offered with very
little comment; and there are a lot of mature democ-
racies where structures and processes fall short of
this ideal. The reason for absence of detailed com-
ment is that what particular institutions and proce-
dures can and cannot accomplish is the subject of
several later presentations and discussion periods.
The reason for the listing device is to enable the use
of the enumeration for checking other countries' situ-
ation
I. Institutions
I.I Specialist Committees are a key compo-
nent of any sound institutional framework for effec-
tive oversight, and nowhere more so than in the na-
tional security arena. Such is the range of govern-
ment business over which the executive must be held
accountable that a division of labour is necessary if
scrutiny is to be anything but perfunctory. Expertise
can be nurtured here and used to good effect in the
interrogation of individuals in formal 'hearings' and
the inspection of documents on a continuous basis
(with or without assistance from the national 'secu-
rity community'). Transcripts of 'hearings' and more
structured committee reports can be important con-
tributions to policy debate and to the appraisal of
resource allocation and resources management (both
government-wide and in particular areas like de-
fence).
I.2 Permanent Parliamentary Staff are what
the military would call a 'force multiplier' so far as
the effectiveness of specialist committees are con-
cerned (and indeed in servicing the elected chamber
as a whole and individual members). Because of its
sheer scale, the intensity of oversight and the consti-
tutional powers of the Congress of the United States
- to make line-item changes to the President's Budget,
for example - the set-up on Capitol Hill cannot be
emulated anywhere else, in my view: and no-one
should try to do that. However, there is no country
that would not benefit hugely from striving to re-
cruit personnel of the quality of (most) committee
staffers, members of the Congressional Research
Service and servants of the Library of Congress.
Many European legislatures are well served in this
respect also and the Secretariat of the NATO Parlia-
mentary Assembly offers excellent training to peo-
ple from aspirant NATO countries and partner states.
1.3 A respected and well-organised Audit Of-
fice (Chamber, Camera or Court) is an indispensa-
ble arm of the legislature with, naturally, a special
significance when it comes to the performance of
both the classical and value-for-money audit func-
tions. Such a complement of professional staff is a
parliament's principal financial watchdog, always on
the look-out for fraud, waste and mismanagement
(plus less spectacular cases of uneconomic, ineffi-
cient and ineffective resource use). Again, the scope
and scale of the work of the United States' institu-
tion - the General Accounting Office (GAO) - make
it an impractical model for any other country. How-
ever, the United Kingdom's National Audit Office
(NAO) is a more modest but no less well-run body
with much to teach about operations in the defence
audit field (as are some other European bureaus).
Having said that, my personal conviction is that as a
general rule each country should fashion its own pro-
vision in this field, if need be starting from very small
beginnings. Tailored provision can take full account
ofIocal conditions, possibly incorporating safeguards
against the circumvention or overthrow of the of-
fice's findings - or intimidation of its personnel - if
there exists or could exist an executive prone to au-
thoritarian (anti-democratic) tendencies.
II. Procedures
Ihave mentioned specialist committee 'hear-
ings' and reports plus audit office investigations
which, arguably, fall under the 'procedures' head-
ing. My 'ideal' provision for effective performance
of the legislature's dual (representational and over-
sight) role in national security affairs would, how-
ever, include much more than these.
11.1 Question Time is a democratic procedure
- perhaps even an institution which, though not prac-
tised everywhere, is invariably valued where it is.
Requiring a prime minister or chief executive, and
departmental heads like the defence minister, to stand
periodically before the whole elected chamber to
answer prior-notice questions, and possible supple-
mentaries, is in the first place a marvellous piece of
political symbolism. The executive is literally an-
swerable to 'the people' (through their chosen rep-
resentatives). This is accountability in its purest form,
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direct and personal. In the second place, this is a func-
tional arrangement. It allows general matters of con-
cern to be raised. It allows particular issues to be
ventilated whether of nation-wide significance or of
special constituency interest. It can be a vehicle for
eliciting information, which the executive may have
been reluctant to share or for seeking precise justifi-
cation for a specific action about which the adminis-
tration might have preferred to remain reticent. It
should also be noted here that the existence of the
procedure itself produces results. More care is taken,
in all aspects of governance, when people know that
their minister may be called to account in this way;
and political decision-making and public adminis-
tration are the better for it. (The same applies, of
course, to the prospect of an appearance before a
specialist committee that has acquired a reputation
for searching interrogation or an investigation by an
audit bureau whose strictures can precipitate a poli-
tician's or a public servant's downfall.)
11.2Provision for Special Debates on specific
occasions is important as well. The appearance of
an important government policy statement (a new
Doctrine or National Security Concept, in old east-
ern bloc parlance) or of a major parliamentary re-
port or minutes of evidence (from a specialist com-
mittee or the audit body) - such events should, in my
view, be marked by exchanges before the whole
elected chamber, even if the constitutional rules do
not require this. The practice gives substance to ac-
countability. The legislature's timetable should be
sufficiently flexible to accommodate such exercises.
11.3 The timetable should also feature Statu-
tory or Routine Debates. The most important of these
is, of course, consideration of the overall state budget,
the occasion when elected representatives exert 'the
power of the purse ' (which should always reside with
the legislature for at least two reasons, respect for
the 'no taxation without representation' principle and
for the elected chamber's right to be the fmal arbiter
of national spending priorities). In addition, though,
there is a good case for periodic reconsideration and
reaffirmation - annual or biennial, say - of certain
major statutes, a category in which one would cer-
tainly include legislation relating to the raising and
maintenance of the military and other armed struc-
tures of the state. Among other things, this ensures
regular formal policy accountability in this area to
match the yearly exercise of financial accountabil-
ity which consideration of the budget represents.
11.4 Both regular and occasional government
Publications on its business - including national se-
curity affairs - are a final prerequisite for effective
legislative oversight of the executive, as well as ap-
propriate recognition of parliament's and the pub-
lic's fundamental 'right to know' and tangible ex-
pressions of a 'commitment to transparency' and
'open' government all round. A minimal checklist
for regular defence publications would include: an
annual or biennial major policy statement, with a
report on security-related diplomatic activity and
military operations plus a summary budget; a detailed
budget for the immediately forthcoming year, incor-
porating a programme attribution ifpracticable, plus
outline expenditure projections for up to five years
hence; and certified annual accounts, appearing not
more than two years after the period to which they
relate, the time-lag reflecting the practical require-
ment to complete the book-keeping and ensure that
the financial record has been audited and found cor-
rect (or otherwise, as the case may be). One would
also hope that many elected assemblies might press,
in due course, for (a) performance reports in the
modem management style, explicitly relating accom-
plishments to objectives; (b) major projects state-
ments, documenting the status of high-value weap-
ons acquisition programmes and exposing any cost
escalation or 'in-service date' delays occurring on
them; and (c) a counterpart manpower report, docu-
menting recent recruitment, manning, retention and
retirement experience and providing early warning
of imminent problems in the personnel field (if any).
In conclusion, this seven-point checklist could
be used to evaluate provision for effective perform-
ance of other legislature's role in the serious busi-
ness of democratic governance, with particular ref-
erence to national security affairs. •
